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TOWARD A RADICAL REASSESSMENT OF SOCIAL WORK VALUES
By
Shimon S. Gottschalk
SYNOPSIS
Social Work's inherited statements of core values are excessively
individualistic and politically conservative, posing a false
dichotomy of individual versus society. "Maximizing individual
opportunities for self expression", is criticized as an outdated,
if not dangerous value stance. An alternative position Is
suggested which sets as the valued aim of all social work practice
the enhancement within and among individuals and society of the
capacity for sharing and reciprocity. The promotion of a just
society and of individual well being are viewed as being inextri-
cably intertwined.
The origins of American social work are to be traced to the Western,
predominantly liberal-bourgeois traditions and aspirations of the late
nineteenth, and early twentieth century. Social work has grown, and in many
ways prospered under this banner. But the society and the world within
which Social Workers practice is changing rapidly. Thus, the liberalism of
yesteryear may quickly be transformed into the conservatism of today - by
means of the simple process of non-change.
This paper is a first effort, a preliminary reexamination of some of
the traditions upon which contemporary social work practice theory is built.
Its aim is to reinterpret this tradition in the light of insights which, in
this latter part of the twentieth century, might be denotated as emerging
from a "new-liberal", i.e., a radical perspective. It will conclude with
a suggested reformulation of the inherited core values of social work.
By radical is meant, quite simply, a perspective which is committed to
the reexamination of the roots, the fundamental assumptions, the inherited
wisdom of the past. The purpose is not necessarily to destroy or undermine
existing institutions, but rather to critically reevaluate them and to
reinterpret them without deference to prevailing arrangements of power and
privilege, in order that they may more fully meet the dqmands of a new era.
The emphasis is on values because social work has constantly viewed
itself as a value based profession. Social workers are the "professional
altruistso, committed to doing "the good", not merely the feasible.
Shimon S. Gottschalk, Ph.D., is Associate Profpssor of Social Policy & Plan-
ning, School of Social Work, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida.
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Social work is a profession of "humanitarianism in action".1  Everything
social workers do as professional persons is, ideally speaking, reconcilable
with a basic value stance.
Values are criteria for preference or choice. They are judgements,
conceptions of desirable states of affairs which serve to justify proposed
or actual behavior. As such, the truth or falsehood of a particular value
stance is not subject to empirical research. Values are not to be confused
with ethics. Ethics deals with standards of behavior or action in relation
to others. Ethics tends to be more particularistic than values, applying
to specific relationships at specific times, e.g. the relationship between
men and women, or workers and clients. Ethics is based, in part, upon
values, and it is subsidiary to them. Values, by contrast, involve judg-
ments of ultimate concern which remain unmodified by specific circumstances.
The Core Values of Social Work
During the last twenty years, a number of attempts have been made
within the social work profession to identify, if not codify, a statement
of core values. In the Working Definition of Social Work Practice of 1958,
under the heading of values, one central statement itands forth: "the
individual is the primary concern of this society". As William E. Gordon,
in his Critique of the Working Definition, indicated, the other value-
related statements included in the Working Definition, do not, strictly
speaking, constitute value judgements.4 Gordon subsequently offered the
following alternative formulation:
"It is good and desirable for man to fulfill his potential, to
realize himself, and to balance this with essentially equal
effort to help others to fulfill their capacities and realize
themselves."I
An international seminar on values sponsored by the Council of Social
Work Education in Honolulu, in 1966, came to a somewhat similar conclusion.
The participants agreed upon a pair of statements each of which is
expressed in the form of a balance:
"1. The worth and dignity of the individual as related to
the well being and integrity of the group:
2. The progress and development of the individual and
society, as related to the security of the individual
and society."D
Gunnar Myrdal, in his keynote address to the 14th International
Congress of Schools of Social Work in 1968, suggested as a core statement
of values, the universality of the "quest for social and economic equality
as the sovereign ideal of all major religions and philosophies."6 The
International Congress, which was largely oriented toward the discussion of
the theme of social work values, did not fully agree with Myrdal's statement.
Many of the participants felt that this view of basic values was too materi-
alistic; it did not sufficiently take into account spiritual values, such as
human dignity and worth.
The United States report to this same International Congress, prepared
by Mary J. McCormick, after reviewing a variety of viewpoints and issues, con-
cluded that, "assuring to every human being the opportunity to attain his
miximum potential. . . represents the consolidation of all values - from
personal worth to self-determination; from freedom to social experience and
social responsibility."/
These are only a few of the statements which have emerged during the
st two decades around the Issue of core values of the social work profession.
course there are others, such as the statement suggested by, Objectives of
the at Curriculum of the Future8 and the introduction to "Ols or Public
Soia Y7 and the first paragraph of RASW Code of Ethics.1v
What Seems to Be the Problem?
Reviewing these statements and the discussions which accompany them is
somehat like experiencing a baptism that does not cleanse. We are left
with the feeling that personal intuition and conscience remain our primary
tid to action. There are too many unresolved problems, among them theliming;
1. If Social Work values need to be expressed in terms of a balance
between individual and societal needs, then what is the
principle in terms of which this balance is to be adjudi-
cated? What are the indicators? What are the weights? In
shbrt, in a particular situation, how does one decide
between Individual good and the good of society?
2. There is elegance In a single economical statement of basic
values such as McCormick's idea of opportunity to attain
maximu Individual potential. The advantage of such a
unitary statement 1ies In the fact that one need not be
concerned with issues of priority or of balance. All of
the values are presumably subservient to, and derivable
from this one. But are they? Does this not simply shift
the burden of the question of priorities among values, e.g..
the contest between freedom and security, to a different
level of analysis?
3. To what degree can and should Social Work values coincide
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with the values of the society at large? Werner Boehm, one
of the grand architects of the social work curriculum,
suggested that the coincidence between the two is not, and
cannot be complete. 11 If there are such differences, then
what are the principles which underlie the distinction? Or
more specifically, under what circumstances can and should
Social Workers serve as agents of social control, and under
what circumstances shall they act as agents of social change? 12
4. Of special importance to social workers is the issue of value
dissensus between clients and workers. What shall the social
worker do when there is value dissensus between him/her self
and the client system? This question which gnaws at the very
root of the theory of advocacy is not resolved by existing
statements of core values. 13 All professions appear to agree
that public interest and client interest must regularly
precede the interest of Je particular profession and of the
individual practitioner. But what shall the professional
social worker do when he is convinced that what the client
wants is wrong, that the client is preparing to act contrary
to his (i.e., the worker's) core system of values? 15
5. What is the significance of values as related to other com-
ponents of professional practice? For example, which has
priority, commitment to social work values, or commitment to
knowledge? There are some within the profession, such as
Nathan Cohen, who consider values as the fountainhead and
root of all practice. Others, such as Specht, appear not to
agree. The latter considers an over-concern with issues of
social justice to one of the major threats to the survival
of the profession. According to this view, the core of
professionalism is not a set of values but specific, finely
tuned practice skills.
6. On the day to day level social workers continually face
conflicts between practical expediency and principle. Are
principled values to serve as the primary criteria for all
their actions, or shall the perceived institutional interests
of the system they serve (i.e., agencies, professional
associations, or society as a whole) be their primary
professional guide? 17
The several issues which have been raised above are largely formal in
nature; they deal more nearly with the structure and the internal logic of
the statements of core values than with their substantive content. We make
mention of them here without laying claim to the hope that they can all be
satisfactorily resolved in the discussion which follows.
- - C
Individualism Revisited
Having identified some of the formal problems associated with the
Inherited statements of core values, let us now turn more specifically to a
discussion of their substance.
On the whole these statements are highly person centered: the
individual is the focus and society serves as the backdrop. Whereas the
emphases differ, we repeatedly sense that, liplicit within these statements
is a view of the individual versus society. This is assumed to be the
fundamental contest of life and the aim lies In discovering an acceptable but
difficult balance.
Now this is a uniquely capitalistic conception of person and society,
scarcely at variance with the views of persons historically as far apart as
Adam Smith and Milton Freedman. Each individual is assumed to be In
competition with all others and the collectivity exists primarily in order to
assure and secure individual rights. The good life is a life of independence
and self-sufficiency. The goal of social welfare within such a society is to
encourage, promote, maximize self-sufficiency. It is often naively assumed
that the sum of individual goods constitutes the good of the whole.19
The idea of a dichotomy between the individual and society derives
ample support from major traditions within the social sciences. Function-
alism appears to have placed a greater emphasis upon society, its
institutions, and their need for Integration. By contrast, existensialist
theory has stressed Individualism. But In both traditions the issues are
usually expressed in terms of a dualistic struggle.
For example, Talcott Parsons and his followers point to the contest
between integration and adaptation. Philip Lichtenberg suggests that this
dichotomy Is implicit in most contemporary psychoanalytic theories: outer
reality is usually viewed as a source of frustrations calling for the
renunciation of individual, anti-social tendencies.2U Similarly, the
currently dominant strain in political theory represented by Banfleld, Dahl,
Lindblom, and others suggests that the public Interest is a resultant
emerging from the competition of all private interest with each other.
21
Thus, the public interest also competes with every private interest.
Social Workers have rarely challenged the basic value asjymptions up-
on which these contemporary social scientific views are built.a They have
dismissed out of hand the ideas of turn-of-the-century socialists such as
Peter Kropotkin who suggested that the fundamental principle of life an
society may well be thought to be cooperation, rather than competition. 
3
Instead of having associated itself with this or similar views, the social
work profession has increasingly allied Itself with theories of competitive
individualism, or predominantly system maintaining functionalism, or both.
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Thus, social workers have, for example, become champions of equality of
opportunity, despite their awareness that in a socially highly stratified
society this invariably leads to inequality of outcome They know that when
unequal persons compete, the stronger invariably wins.
The capitalist system and the values which support it have institution-
alized a harsh concept of social inequality and the social work profession
(though not all social workers) has, in effect, adopted it as its own.
Despite all protestations to the contrary, Americans believe in inequality
because they assume that this is what makes their system prosper. Social
workers in their pragmatic search for legitimacy among established
authorities have cooperated; they have not protested this view.
Functional social analysis and its implicit view of the individual
versus society, perhaps precisely because of its close parallel with the
concept of economic man (sic), is out of tune with many of the basic
intuitions of social work practice. Social workers are intimately aware of
the destructiveness of excessive individualism. Equally, though perhaps
more subtly, they are aware that the most significant exchanges between one
person and another, or one person and all others are not functional, not
contractual, not material. The rules and principles of economics do not
apply because love, and hope, and dignity, and creativity are not limited
like scarce natural resources: the more love or hope a person is able to
give, the more love and hope exists within the world. There is no necessary
and inevitable zero-sum game in the primary relationships among human beings.
There is no necessary and inevitable conflict between the individual and
society because they compete as little as a flower competes with the soil or
the bird competes with the sky.
2 1
The individualistic value stance is compatible with present social work
practice only to the extent that it consists of a social service strategy.
As has now been frequently suggested by scholars, the social services
constitute in their essence, methods of social coqtrol, meeting the interests
of established authorities and of the status quo. Within such a context,
to do the good is to help maintain the existing order. In short, social
services, though motivated by claims to social idealism and liberalism are,
in essence, conservative.
But social work, since its beginning around the turn of the century,
has had an additional, a broader vision which extends beyond the provision
of social services. To the extent that social workers have been sensitive
to the brutalities and injustices of our society they have been impelled to
act for societal change. The principles which guide their practice are
based upon the recognition that the madness is neither entirely in people's
heads, nor totally beyond their (the people's) reach because of inexorable
laws of politics and society. It would appear that a new statement of core
values for the social work profession must be guided by these latter
- - - I -
insights, rather than by an outdated support of individualism.
The new humanism can no longer be equated with individualism, empha-
sizing thevTrtues of self-fulfillment, self-expression, and equality of
opportunity. Rather, a renewed emphasis must be placed upon the realization
that human beings humanize each other, that consciousness, and knowing, and
establishing meaning and purpose in life are all necessarily social acts.
There is no dichotomy, no conflict between individu and society in those
areas which are of most fundamental concern to social work practice. The
new vision of core values in social work2 ust proceed from a conception of
the individual inseparable from society.27
Not only as agents of social control, or as agents of individual
liberation, but primarily as co-workers in the creation of a just society
must social workers ftnd their place. Within such a society (as well as
within the struggle for such a society) the individual is viewed as both the
creator and the created, the actor is both subject and object (e.g., the
caseworker is, in part, client), the process is a part of the valued goal.
Individual well being is possible only within a Just society, and the just
society is possible only where individuals are healthy and personally
fulfilled.
The Just Society
While we have rejected the view of individual versus society, it is of
primary Importance that we not make the opposite error, the error of reduc-
tionism which assumes their systematic identity. The relationship between
individual and society is one of reciprocity, but they are significantly
different types of entities to which entirely different concepts of well
being apply.
A group Is more than a series of individuals; a community is more than
a geographically confined collection of organizations; a society is more
than a sum if institutions. The whole is always something more, and some-
thing different than the sum of its parts. This basic proposition Qf Gener-
al Systems Theory lies at the root of the discussion which follows.05
Let us now return to a point alluded to only in passing above. A
just society is not simply one that results from the Interactional sum of
socially functional, or mentally healthy, or of God-fearing, or self-
actualized individuals. The revered American tradition which posits the
social ideal of "the greatest good for the greatest number" is, in effect,
based upon a false reductionist principle. Social work has in error
identified with this tradition. As suggested above, the good Is defined,
'voted" as it were, as the maximization of individual desires, to the
extent that these do not conflict with the desires of others. The Just
society, according to this view, is a resultant produced by the expression
of a multiplicity of individual desires.
There are at least three difficulties which may be associated with this
doctrine. First, since the good is defined by the majority, and since the
majority is, e.g., white and middle class, it is their good, not other
people's good which will be socially defined as te good. Thus, we have the
basis for cultural colonialism. Second, the doctrine is missing a distrib-
utive principle. Thus, increasing the total quantity of good available
within society as a result of the maximization of individual desires does not
guarantee that those who are at the bottom of the system will get their fair
share. Social workers are, of course, intimately aware of the fact that an
increase in national wealth has not automatically lead to a reduction of
private poverty (sic).29 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this
doctrine is one which seemingly inevitably blesses the status quo. What is,
is just and good. Given this orientation, it is inconceivable that the
greatest good for the greatest number might according to some independent
standard be considered "no good".
Social workers have been concerned with these problems for many years
but their expressions of core values have provided them with little theoret-
ical guidance. But this is the post-Eichmann, and the post-Mylai era. We
know that the ethical standards which govern institutions differ in princi-
ple, not only in degree, from those which govern individuals. In their own
eyes, both Eichmann and Lt. Calley at Mylai were convinced that they were
fulfilling the moral imperatives implicit in their assigned roles. Yet
there is no court of law that can properly judge the acts of these individ-
uals in isolation, acting as if these were simply corrupt, morally debased
individuals. In some sense we must be able to admit that it is the
institutions which hey served and the societies of which they are a part
that are also evil.1 0  By the same token, if racism Is a social problem
then its solution lies not simply in arresting and reeducating the individ-
ual racist: somewhow the entire society must also be taken to task.
Again we return to the question, what shall be the nature of a just
society? Here the work of the philosopher John Rawls in his recent
important contribution to moral philosophy, A Theory of Justice, promises
to provide mijor support to the development of a new understanding of social
work values. We will touch only on Rawls' major points.
Traditional moral theory distinguishes between the good and the right.
For the 19th century Utilitarians such as Mills and Bentham, the good for
society is the greatest net balance of satisfactions summed over all the
individuals belonging to it. The right is defined as that which maximizes
the good. 32 William E. Gordon, in discussing the working Definition of
Social Work Practice makes an analogous distinction.3 3  He distinguishes
between value (the good) and knowledge (the right). For Gordon, values are
"the preferred", and knowledge is "the confirmed". For both Gordon and
Utilitarians, the good is defined independently and prior to the right, which
Is another way of saying that the ends are defined prior to, and independent-
ly of the means.
Rawls disagrees with this view. According to his concept of "Justice
as fairness", the right precedes the good. Thus, the emphasis is on the
structure of social institutions and on social processes rather than on the
specification of particular goods. A just social system sets limits, it
"provides a framework of rights and opportunities and the means of satisfac -
tion within and by the use of which these ends may be equitably pursued.1"4
The central problem in specifying the nature of the Just society, therefore,
Is to identify those social structures and processes which will achieve the
good, however it Is defined.
Rawls proceeds with this task by imagining what he calls the "original
position". This constitutes a conceptual scheme wherein a group of rational
persons is asked to decide upon the principles of Justice from a position of
personal neutrality. That Is, none of the individuals participating in the
decision has prior knowledge of his own, particular position within the
social structure. Thus, he Is unable to favor himself, or those who are
socially allied with him, In making his Judgements. Taking this stance,
imagining the original position, Rawls arrives at the following key princi-
ples:
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.
2. Social and economic Inequalities are to be arranged so that they
are both:
l to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and
attached to offices and positions open to aj) under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity.li
By liberty, Rawls means a certain structure of social institutions, a
system of rights and duties which guarantee individual freedom and genuine
choices. It is important to note that liberty inheres within the social
system, not the individual. But liberty has no practical meaning except
when it is utilized by individuals exercising their opportunities for free
choice. Rawls suggests that the first principle, the principle of liberty,
always has priority over the second principle. That is, liberty may never
be sacrificed for the sake of equality.
Rawl's theory of justice offers some important advantages over the
Inherited theories ofsocial justice with which the social work profession
has been identified.3
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1. What is right, what will lead to the good, is not subject
to the "vote" of the majority. In other words, there are
important limits to relativism.
2. A distributive principle is explicitly included which focuses
upon the needs of those who are at the bottom of the social
system, those who are least advantaged.
3. Because of its emphasis on the right, rather than on the good,
this theory has the potential of relating directly to social
work's primary concern with the values implicit in practice,
rather than the goals of practice.
The principles of social justice are here suggested within a non-
reductionist formulation: the just society is not simply an aggregate of
good people who are considerate of each other. The just society does not
compete, need to be balanced with, is not subsidiary to individuals and their
desires. Especially important for social workers, professional persons
oriented toward the facilitation of individual and social change, is the
realization that the just society is not necessarTly one which is maximally
responsive to the desires of the majority. The standards of Justice are
established independently of the power of majorities - or minorities, for
that matter. From a value perspective, the majority can be wrong and the
"greatest good for the greatest number" may be "no good."
If this amounts to intellectual elitism, then let us admit it. Indeed,
a certain amount of elitism is implicit in all professional practice. All
professionals lay claim to knowledge and expertise which is beyond the ken
of the majority. What reason is there to be different when it comes to the
issue of professional values?
A New Beginning - Not the End
This paper has viewed social work as an expression and an outgrowth of
late 19th and early 20th century Western capitalism. It has helped to
sustain and expand the capacities for social control of an expanding,
materially prosperous social order. In this sense, its success has
paralleled the success of the society as a whole. In capitalism, the major
emphasis upon individualism has served as an important foundation for both
material prosperity and for a unique concept of personal freedom - freedom
distinct from liberty and in competition with social responsibility. The
social work profession has, in the main, chosen to ally itself with this
view.
But our society is changing rapidly. The profession of social work
needs to be prepared to confront the problems of a new society in which
growth and progress are not inevitable. One of the major tasks imposed upon
_17 -
social work and all professions is to fathom the impact upon Western
consciousness of a non-growth economy. There are other indicators of change.
Our society has moved from collective production to an increasing emphasis
un collective consumption as well. Private entrepreneurship has all but
Iiv way to corporate enterprise. The government has become the single
argest emloyer. The service society has arrived, in that less than half of
the work force is engaged In the production of goods. Less than twenty
percent of the work force is engaged In manufacturing.
In the light of these changes we sense the imminent danger that our
highly individualistic value system is leading us in the direction of an
ever more fragmented social order, a society in which anomie has become the
rm and in which social and economic inequalities are highly accentuated.
Perhaps evm more threatening is the likelihood that this society will
qlpkly led to the inauguration of grqgtly regimented, controlled, plan-
lu11y totally integrated social order.J'
The alternative towards which we have been groping in this paper is
ON Which attempts to break down familiar conceptual barriers and views the
individual as inseparable from his/her society and world. The individual
and society are reciprocally Intertwined and the health of one demands the
welfare of the other. Such a changed value orientation is more likely to
serve the-now liberallit of the post-modern era.
It is strangely unfashionable to speak in the language of ideals. Yet
It is In the essence of any discussion of values that one must reach for
idealized conceptualizations. Finally, valued ideals become criteria for
decision making and action. Without further apology, therefore, let us
suggest, experimentally, a new statement of valued goals for the social work
profession:
The central and valued aim of social work practice is the
promotion and enhancement within and among individuals and
society of the capatity and opportunity for sharing and
reciprocity.
The expansion and the sharing of all those most valued goods,
such as love, wisdom, mutuality, beauty, dignity, and Joy,
etc., for which there Is no economic market because there is
ind can be no scarcity, constitutes the essence of all
practice relitionships.
The capacity to create and share non-economic goods is
intimately intertwined with, and contingent upon, the existence
of a Jvst social order and just social institutions within
which economic goods are shared equally, which maximize
liberty, and which are so structured as to champion the
interests of the least advantaged in every social situation.
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The next, and truly monumental task is to identify, discover, and
invent those social and individual therapeutic methods and those institution-
al forms which derive from, and most nearly give expression to these valued
ideals. There is no reason to believe that the task will be easy. The
problems are theoretical, scientific, and most importantly, political ....
But that leads us to an entirely new level of the discussion.
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